

GUIDE TO THE 2019 INDONESIA ELECTIONS

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ELECTION DAY IN 2019

On Wed 17 April 2019, 190 million Indonesian voters will set off to the polls to elect their President and Vice-President. On this day they will also elect 136 members of the national Regions House, a kind of weak Senate, together with 575 members of the powerful House of Representatives. In addition they will elect 2,207 provincial level MPs from the 34 Provinces and also elect 17,610 local councillors across more than 500 local authorities.

THE PATH TO THE PRESIDENCY

To win the election, a Presidential/Vice-presidential team must secure over 50% of the popular vote. If no candidate secures 50% of the vote in the first round then the top two candidate pairs face off in a second round.

The path to winning the election, however, consists of several stages. The process begins with nomination. While Indonesia today, like the USA, operates a presidential system of government, the DNA from the country's various old parliamentary systems is often close to the surface. For example, candidacy is determined by demonstrating support from parties in the House of Representatives (DPR). A candidate team needs to show they have the support of parties commanding at least 20% of seats in the current DPR or 25% of the votes their parties secured in the last election.

Given that there are no large parties in the current Parliament (the largest party commands less than 20% of the seats and votes), candidate teams invariably form coalitions of support. Coalitions in Indonesia are much more fluid than in Australia as their prime functions are to ensure a party's preferred presidential/vice-presidential candidate is able to pass the nomination threshold and then later to participate in post-election cabinets should their candidate be successful.

In terms of ideological coherence, coalitions tend to be formed in order to reach out across Indonesia's key political cleavages. This often includes efforts to bridge ethnic and regional/geographic divisions. Most significantly it includes a need to reach out to those who see the nation's most populous religion, Islam, as central to their political thinking and yet also to ensure that concerns of minorities, as well as Muslims who reject appeals to sectarian solidarity are considered. Differences in economic policy do not tend to divide voters or parties. Most campaign teams tend to promote a welfarist approach with autarkist appeals to economic self-sufficiency and declarations to streamline the bureaucracy and reduce corruption.

WHO IS RUNNING IN 2019?

Nominations closed on 10 August. In the weeks leading up to this deadline party leaders, spokespeople and would-be candidates engaged in a frenetic pace of meetings, counter meetings, balloon floating and popping with the media full of chat shows and panels, general reporting and lots of speculation on permutations of possible candidate pairings. On the final day of nomination, two pairs of candidates came forward. These comprised:



Joko Widodo & Ma'ruf Amin

This candidacy is being supported by 9 parties led by the party of former President Megawati Sukarnoputri (PDIP). President Jokowi is a member of this party. This team is also supported by the party of former President Soeharto (Golkar), the party of former President Wahid (PKB), the party of former Vice-president Hamzah Haz (PPP). Two other supporting parties, which have seats in the current parliament, are both splinters from Golkar and led respectively by a media tycoon (NasDem) and the current Speaker of the Senate (Hanura). There are also 3 parties without seats in Parliament. One is an old splinter party of Golkar (PKPI), another is a new party led by another media tycoon (Perindo) and the other is a new party led by young people and hoping to propel youth and women in the political process (PSI).

Collectively this coalition represents 60% of seats in the Parliament and 62% of all votes from the last elections.



Prabowo Subianto & Sandiaga Uno


Facing off against this coalition is Lt Gen (ret) Prabowo Subianto, who ran and lost to Pres. Jokowi in 2014. He also has a new vice-presidential running mate, Mr Sandiaga Solehuddin Uno, the current Deputy Governor of Jakarta and a high profile young entrepreneur prior to entering politics. This coalition is supported by Mr Prabowo's party (Gerindra). Other members of the coalition consist of the party led by former President Yudhoyono (Dem), the Speaker of the National Assembly (PAN), and the party often seen as Indonesia's fraternal peer of the Muslim Brotherhood (PKS). Finally there is a new party, led by former President Soeharto's youngest son, Tommy Soeharto (Berkarya).

Collectively this coalition represents 40% of seats and 36% of all votes from the last elections.

Beyond these parties there are two other parties that have not been included in either coalition namely PBB and Garuda.

Setting aside the new parties, the main changes between the two pairs of coalitions that competed in 2014 and 2019 is that Golkar and PPP have switched from supporting the Prabowo candidacy in 2014 to supporting the Jokowi candidacy in 2019. The following chart outlines the breakdown of support for various presidential coalitions since the first such elections in 2004.

Total Indonesian Voters



BERKARYA
Partai Berkarya; Work Party
Party leader: Tommy Soeharto
Notable Figure: Titiiek Soeharto



DEM
Partai Demokrat; Democratic Party
Party leader: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
Notable Figure: Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono



GARUDA
Partai Gerakan Perubahan Indonesia; Movement for Indonesian Change Party
Party leader: Ahmad Ridha Sabana
Notable Figure: Abdullah Mansuri



GERINDRA
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya; Greater Indonesia Movement Party
Party leader: Prabowo Subianto
Notable Figure: Fadli Zon



GOLKAR
Partai Golongan Karya; Functional Groups Party
Party leader: Airlangga Hartarto
Notable Figure: Aburizal Bakrie



HANURA
Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat; Conscience of the People's Party
Party leader: Oesman Sapta Odang
Notable Figure: Wiranto



NASDEM
Partai Nasional Demokrat; National Democrat Party
Party leader: Surya Paloh
Notable Figure: Siti Nurbaya Bakar



PAN
Partai Amanat Nasional; National Mandate Party
Party leader: Zulkifli Hasan
Notable Figure: Amien Rais



PBB
Partai Bulan Bintang; Moon and Star Party
Party leader: Yusril Izha Mahendra
Notable Figure: Hamdan Zoelva



PDIP
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan; Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle
Party leader: Megawati Sukarnoputri
Notable Figure: Joko Widodo



Perindo
Partai Persatuan Indonesia; United Indonesia Party
Party leader: Hary Tanoesoedibjo
Notable Figure: Liliana Tanoesoedibjo



PKB
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; National Awakening Party
Party leader: Muhaimin Iskandar
Notable Figure: Abdurrachman Wahid



PKPI
Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia; Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
Party leader: A. M. Hendropriyono
Notable Figure: Try Sutrisno



PKS
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; Justice and Welfare Party
Party leader: Sohibul Iman
Notable Figure: Fahri Hamzah



PPP
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party
Party leader: Muhammad Romahurmuziy
Notable Figure: Hamzah Haz



PSI
Partai Solidaritas Indonesia; Indonesian Solidarity Party
Party leader: Grace Natalie
Notable Figure: Raja Juli Antoni

PROSPECTS

Looking at the relative strengths of the candidacies it may be tempting to conclude that the incumbent should enjoy a relatively easy win. This would be unwise. First voters are perfectly happy to “split” their votes. Many “old hands” have failed to get elected because they presumed creating a huge coalition of party support would guarantee a victory. Indeed in the presidential elections of 2014, it was Mr Prabowo’s coalition that enjoyed a majority of votes (especially considering the “neutral” party ultimately aligned with his coalition) from the just concluded parliamentary elections. In other examples Mr Jokowi won the governorship of Jakarta in 2012 with only 20% support in that region’s most recently concluded parliamentary elections. In June this year the Governor, who won the election in the important province of South Sulawesi, won 44% of the popular vote although only has 27% support in the provincial council. Most telling was the election results for mayor in the capital of South Sulawesi. In that election there was only 1 candidate and he enjoyed the support of 10 of the 11 parties in the council. Despite that a majority of voters chose to reject this candidate.

With particular respects to the forthcoming presidential election, it would be therefore be unwise to presume an automatic incumbent victory. From having been a witness to all previous presidential elections in Indonesia, it would be fair to say that Mr Prabowo is the best performer on the hustings.

ECHOES FROM ELECTIONS PAST

This presidential election will be, in many ways, a re-run to the election of 2014 with the same two presidential hopefuls facing each other. Those election campaigns were, with little doubt, the most aggressively prosecuted yet. The rise of social media as platforms for fog horn into echo chambers of partisanship and false rumour mongering were already quite evident. Opponents of Mr Jokowi, in a blatant copy-cat attack approach deployed by opponents of Pres Obama in his presidential bids, sought to portray Jokowi as Sino-Indonesian, communist and Catholic¹ as well as questioning whether he was a

real leader or just a puppet of others. Opponents of Mr Prabowo sought to diminish his eligibility noting he has no wife, raising questions of his military record and concerns about his commitment to democracy.

Issues relating to religion, and in particular the role of the majority religion and its adherents in the public domain, have always been key dynamics within Indonesian politics. These elections will continue to be influenced by this issue. Indeed the dramatic experiences of the 2017 election of Jakarta’s Governor suggest this issue has growing traction as a vote mover. The fallout from this election continues to horrify or embolden (depending on one’s partisan standing) the national political scene. The complexities and dynamics of those elections are worthy of several PhDs. Even so a couple of issues stand out. The then blunt talking Sino-Indonesian Christian Governor of Jakarta faced off against two contenders, each of whom fell over each other to present themselves as guardians of the sensibilities of the faithful in Jakarta where about 85% of the population is Muslim.

A not unrelated issue to that of religious affiliation, as a mover of community sentiment, is the issue of social inequity – often a dog whistle used to remind voters that members of the small Sino-Indonesian community dominate Indonesia’s private sector. The then Governor was in so many ways a lightning rod to all these issues.

A series of massive demonstrations in late 2016 directed against the Governor, replete with demands he be jailed for blasphemy, crippled his campaign and did indeed end up with him being jailed. The scale of those demonstrations spooked the political elite. They were left pondering that today these masses cut down the governor; what about tomorrow – maybe me? For the President and his supporters, the specter of those demonstrations were especially shattering, given the governor had been so close politically to Jokowi.

1 Opponents of Mr Obama sought to portray him as African, liberal and Muslim.

Of relevance to the upcoming presidential election is that both Vice-presidential candidates were close to those massive demonstrations. KH Mar'uf was among the leaders calling for the prosecution of the Governor, while Mr Uno was successful in being elected vice-governor and thus part of the team that defeated the beleaguered governor.

In opposing the then governor, these various Muslim groups also reflected very different perspectives and understandings. In many respects the two vice-presidential candidates for next year reflect two quite different Islamic communities.

Kyai Haji Mar'uf Amin, now 75 years old, is the leader of the quasi-state Indonesian Muslim Leaders Assembly, and is also head of the governing board of Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia's largest mass Muslim organisation). Prior to this he was a member of the Presidential Advisory Council. During the Soeharto era he served in the Jakarta Provincial Council representing the old Islamist party, PPP. With the start of Reformasi in 1998, he moved to support the establishment of the more pluralist PKB, led by former President Wahid. In short KH Mar'uf has impeccable Islamic credentials.

For traditional and rural Muslim voters, he carries considerable authority and religious legitimacy.

For example take "F" a teacher from the north coast of rural Central Java. He did feel offended by comments attributed to the former governor and respects the authority of senior clerics like Mr Mar'uf. At the same time he is suspicious of what he sees as the aggressive and arrogant posturing of those Muslim city people who he believes are just aping the Arabs and do not know or respect their own culture. He believes traditional clerics like Mr Mar'uf represent authentic and competent religious leaders.

Mr Sandiaga Solehuddin Uno, who looks more youthful than his 49 years, is a second generation businessman who has created and built capital market investment vehicles. As he prospered, entering the list of Indonesia's richest 50 people, he has developed assiduously a reputation for doing good public deeds in terms of religious piety and maintaining a good and healthy lifestyle. To this end he has been active with various Islamic groups, including the progressive Paramadina Foundation.

In many respects he is the poster boy and role model for the aspirational urban Muslim middle class.

Take "T" as an example. She is the first in her family to attend university and has recently graduated as a computer engineer. She does not wear a niqab but has no problem that others do. However she is also the first in her family to wear a white head scarf as she sees this as a key aspect of demonstrating her piety. She is very concerned about a breakdown in community morality and looks forward to one day living in a Muslim housing estate. She believes that only Muslims should lead the country, but says that they need to have a modern education as well.

LOOKING TOWARDS THE CAMPAIGN

In the lead up to and during the campaign, we should expect to hear lots of stories about the potential for violence. I have been in Indonesia for the past 6 elections. The only violence I have seen took place in the era before democracy. Experts have been predicting violence since the transitional elections of 1999. Like a broken clock that gets the time right twice a day, the naysayers will one day get it right. In the meantime, however, they will continue to get it wrong. Analysing those previous democratic elections leads me to conclude that I do not expect these elections to degenerate into violence.

The selection of figures who cut across key Islamist groupings as Vice-presidential candidates suggest this will blunt the capacity for this issue to be deployed as a deeply polarising tool for one or other candidates as it was in 2017.

One impact of this could see stresslines move to within the voting groups, especially for the Jokowi-Mar'uf team. Many of those voters who most passionately oppose the use of appeals to sectarian sentiment will see Mr Mar'uf as one who does. While many such people are instinctively drawn towards President Jokowi, they will be unenthusiastic about supporting a ticket that includes Mr Mar'uf. He will need to burnish some credentials as one who embraces Indonesia's pluralism. This will require considerable dexterity considering he led the team within the Indonesian Muslim Leaders Assembly that declared Religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism to be haram (religiously forbidden) and has also been active in advocating in favour of criminalising sexual minorities and ostracising minority Muslim groups.

One such voter is Mrs "S". She is a 40 something urbanite with a professional background. She likes President Jokowi and the fact his family seek and gain no special treatment and he has made some effort to reduce corruption. She respects and applauds his success in dealing with the parlous state of infrastructure that for too long has not been improved. At the same time she is extremely uncomfortable with his choice of running mate seeing him as a key promoter of religious intolerance and enabler of the bullying of religious orthodoxy onto the population observing saying she is fed up with these

holier than thou puritans telling her to wear a head scarf.

In this regard the pairing of Mr Prabowo and Mr Uno will be seen as a more coherent team by their potential supporters.

Mr "B" is a young family man in his 30s. He is private sector employee in a big city. He was a big fan of Mr Prabowo in 2014 and remains as supportive now. He is worried that China is pushing its military weight around the region including on Indonesia. He is also convinced it is also pushing its peoples into the country through the guise of investment projects and laments that nobody is trying to stop this. He believes it is time the country stood up to this foreign power and believes the only leader willing and able to do so is Mr Prabowo. He thinks his vice presidential running mate will be a good match as he is young and good at business.²

One factor that in Indonesia, as elsewhere, can affect prospects for victory is the state of the economy. The Indonesian economy is currently chugging along at a steady albeit unexciting rate about 5% per year. Inflation, by Indonesian historic standards is very low as are interest rates. The budget deficit is within safe limits as are levels of foreign debt. This should give considerable comfort to the supporters of the President. A sudden spike in oil prices might be one point of vulnerability especially should this force the government to raise fuel prices. Fuel price increases do track closely with dips in support for a government.

² "T", "F" represent composites of many people whom I know and who were supportive of those huge demonstrations in late 2016. Meanwhile "S" and "B" represent composites of several people whose collective views and visions bring them into alignment with respective candidates.

A LITTLE PSEPHOLOGY

The chart below outlines the party support for each of the candidates heading towards the elections next year. The division of the parties from left to right are based upon a general division on where they sit on the key issue of the role the majority faith in the public domain.

The Left tends to the view that there should be a clear delineation of that role. The Centre Left also comprise essentially nationalist parties but they also respect the presence of religious thinking but seek not to overtly

favor one over the others. The Centre Right comprise parties close to mass Muslim organisations but are open to people of all faith and reject the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic State. The Right are parties that are founded upon Islam.

In practice, of course, coalition formation and practical politics means that parties frequently stray beyond their place along the spectrum below.

	LEFT		CENTRE LEFT					CENTRE RIGHT	RIGHT
JOKOWI	PSI <i>new</i>	PDIP 19.0	NasDem 6.7	PKPI 0.9	Perindo <i>new</i>	Hanura 5.3	Golkar 14.8	PKB 9.0	PPP 6.5
PRABOWO			Gerindra 11.81	Dem 10.2	Berkarya <i>new</i>			PAN 7.6	PKS 6.8

Among all parties represented in the current Parliament all but two (Golkar and Gerindra) have participated in winning coalitions. This year with these two parties on opposite sides of the campaign, one of them will finally enjoy being part of a presidential election win.

Indonesia's bellwether province is Lampung. In election after election this province, located at the southern end of Sumatra, produces election results that most closely mirror the final national tally. This may be brought about because, while located off-Java, the population of ethnic Javanese is very significant in Lampung, thus creating a population mix that more reflects the national average.

As noted at the beginning of this report in addition to electing the President on 17 April next year voters will also elect MPs to the Parliament. The new election law


contains a couple of notable changes. The first is that any party wishing to win any seat in the Parliament has to gain at least 4% of the national vote. Failure to do so regardless of a party actually winning some areas will mean they still gain no seats. The use of a threshold has been in place since 2009 but the size of the threshold has been raised every election since then. At a quite technical level the way seat victories are determined will shift from the old means of using a simple highest remainder to a new system called St Lague. The essential impact of this new system will to provide an additional benefit to large parties in any electorate. The size of the Parliament has been raised from 560 to 575 seats.

I have reviewed the election results of 2014 and recalculated on the basis of the new 575 seat Parliament and using the new way of calculating election wins. The results are as follows:

PARTY	NEW SEATS	OLD SEATS	CHANGE
PDIP	114	109	5
Golkar	99	91	8
Gerindra	74	73	1
Dem	61	61	0
PAN	51	49	2
PKB	49	47	2
PPP	38	39	-1
NasDem	33	35	-2
Hanura	16	16	0
TOTAL	575	560	15

Over half of the extra seats will go to Golkar with PDIP gaining a further one third of the new seats. Golkar's super benefit is due to the fact every new seat is located off-Java where Golkar's vote is historically higher. PDIP's voting base is more balanced. Of interest is that PKB, whose voting base has historically been highly concentrated on Java has gained 2 additional seats suggesting its efforts to widen its appeal may bear electoral benefits.

The following map outlines which party gained the largest number of votes in each city and county. It is worth noting that on average the winning party in any city or county only secured 28% of the vote in that region.



REGIONS TO WATCH

The key provinces to watch next year include the most populous province, West Java. In securing 60% of its votes in 2014, this province provided Mr Prabowo with his strongest result delivering more than 1/5 of his total national tally. To retain any chance of victory in 2019, his campaign team will need to retain a solid showing here whilst building elsewhere. Recent polling (albeit prior to the close of candidate nominations) suggest he has actually lost support in this province. In this election he will be helped by his youthful presidential running mate given the demographic profile of West Java particularly including its high rate of urbanization; recall the aspirational urban Muslim middle class.


In the other two huge provinces of Central Java and East Java, Mr Jokowi was victorious especially in his home province of Central Java (66%). He should again win handily in this province. East Java gave him a national average win. At this stage, given the recent win in the province by one of his former ministers and supporters, Team Jokowi should be looking with confidence at prospects.

The other two large provinces in Java, in terms of population, Jakarta and Banten will be harder to read.

With Golkar and PPP now part of the Jokowi team and Mr Mar'uf hailing from this region, there may be prospects of improving Jokowi's vote from the low 40s in Banten. Jakarta, which only gave Mr Jokowi a national average victory, could be a potential flip in favour of Mr Prabowo.

In the two largest provinces off-Java, prospects for Mr Prabowo should be looking better in 2019 than in 2014. A close supporter of Mr Prabowo has just been elected Governor of North Sumatra offering prospects of potentially flipping this province towards the Prabowo camp. In South Sulawesi, the absence of incumbent Vice-president Jusuf Kalla, who is the best known South Sulawesi, may reduce the attraction of the Jokowi ticket. While it will be difficult for him to flip this province, Team Prabowo should be looking to do considerably better than the 29% they secured in 2014.

The map below outlines, on the basis of each city and county of the county, which presidential candidate won the popular vote in 2014.



Elevating these results to the provincial level may provide a clearer picture of where each candidate will either need to work to defend or to make progress in order to secure victory next year.

2014 Presidential election results by region



Joko Widodo



Prabowo Subianto

Sumatra: West Sumatra	23.1	76.9
SE Islands: West Nusa Tenggara	34.1	65.9
Sulawesi: Gorontalo	36.9	63.1
Java: West Java	40.2	59.8
Java: Banten	42.9	57.1
Moluccas: Northern Moluccas	45.6	54.5
Sumatra: Aceh	45.6	54.1
Sumatra: South Sumatra	48.7	51.3
Sumatra: Riau	49.9	50.1
Kalimantan: South Kalimantan	50.0	50.1
Moluccas: Moluccas	50.5	49.5
Sumatra: Jambi	50.8	49.3
Sumatra: Lampung	53.1	46.9
Java: Jakarta	53.1	46.9
TOTAL: INDONESIA	53.1	46.9
Java: East Java	53.2	46.8
Overseas: Expats	53.7	46.3
Sulawesi: North Sumatra	53.9	46.1
Sumatra: Bengkulu	54.7	45.3
Sulawesi: Central Sulawesi	54.8	45.2
Sulawesi: Southern Sulawesi	54.9	45.1
Sumatra: North Sumatra	55.2	44.8
Java: Yogyakarta	55.8	44.2
Sumatra: Riau Arch	59.6	40.4
Kalimantan: Central Kalimantan	59.8	40.2
Kalimantan: West Kalimantan	60.4	39.6
Kalimantan: East Kalimantan	63.4	36.6
Java: Central Java	66.7	33.4
Sumatra: Bangka-Belitung	67.3	32.7
Papua: Western Papua	67.6	32.4
SE Islands: Bali	71.4	28.6
Sulawesi: South Sulawesi	71.4	28.6
SE Islands: East Nusa Tenggara	72.5	27.6
Papua: Papua	72.5	27.5
Sulawesi: West Sulawesi	73.4	26.6

With an expected improvement in his base vote in the largest province of West Java, plus a track record of national leadership, and despite choosing the less attractive Vice-presidential running mate, the incumbent President Jokowi remains the front runner at this stage.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Kevin Evans is the Indonesia Director of The Australia-Indonesia Centre. Kevin has been a student of Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular for 35 years. During the 25 years he has lived in Indonesia he has worked variously as a diplomat, stock broker, academic and NGO activist. Prior to joining The Australia-Indonesia Centre, Kevin worked closely with the President's Delivery Unit, UKP4, advising on a number of environmental governance programs.

With the onset of political reform in Indonesia in 1998 he became engaged in a wide range of governance reform issues including constitutional reform, civil service reform, electoral, parliamentary and political party reform and decentralisation. Initially he worked inside the presidential team that drafted the first post-Soeharto-era laws, which promoted the democratisation of the political system. Later, Kevin lived for four years in Aceh working on post-tsunami reconstruction with government ministers to create policies and lead institutions focused on corruption prevention.

Kevin was posted by the UN to Afghanistan during 2002-2003 to assist develop new commissions governing the civil service human rights, elections, the judicial system and constitutional reform. He has also been engaged in supporting reforms to election and counter-corruption systems in Egypt, East Timor, Fiji and Turkey.



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